Formally, the reasoning may be set out as follows:

Argument: Existence is Not Evidence of Immortality

1. Bayesian Principle of Evidence
   E supports H iff P(E | H) > P(E | ¬H).
2. Definitions
   Let
     a. H_perm: a permissive theory of persons, under which personal identity can recur (a person may live more than once);
     b. H_rest: a restrictive theory of persons, under which personal identity is unrepeatable (a person can live at most once);
     c. E: “You exist now.”
3. Huemer’s Claim
   P(E | H_perm) > P(E | H_rest). Therefore, by (1), E supports H_perm; your existence now is evidence for reincarnation.
4. Equivocation Problem
   The proposition E does not have the same content under the two hypotheses.
     a. Under H_perm: “Someone with A, B, C exists now.”
     b. Under H_rest: “Someone with A, B, C, D exists now.”
   Hence E_perm ≠ E_rest; the evidence proposition shifts meaning.
5. Bayesian Comparability Condition
   For Bayes’ theorem to apply, E must refer to the same proposition across all hypotheses. If E varies in meaning, the probabilities P(E | H_perm) and P(E | H_rest) belong to different reference classes, and their ratio (the Bayes factor) is undefined.
6. Semantic Repair
   To restore comparability, fix a single proposition E*:

   “A being with A, B, C exists now.”

   Under this consistent definition,
   
   P(E* | H_perm) = P(E* | H_rest)
   eliminating any evidential advantage for H_perm.
7. Conclusion
   Huemer’s argument fails because it equivocates on the evidence term.
   Once the proposition “you exist now” is defined consistently across H_perm and H_rest, your existence confers no Bayesian support for reincarnation or personal immortality.

Explanatory Note.
This argument concerns only the evidential relation between present existence and competing theories of personal identity, not the broader metaphysics of mind or survival. The variables A, B, C, and D are schematic placeholders for whatever psychological or physical conditions a theory takes to individuate a person; they carry no empirical commitments of their own. The analysis assumes that introspection or self-locating awareness cannot, by themselves, yield special epistemic access to which theory of persons is correct—or if such a route exists, it has yet to be articulated by defenders of the permissive view. Nothing here precludes the possibility that independent evidence (empirical, metaphysical, or otherwise) might someday support H_perm or a reincarnation hypothesis. The point is only that existence alone cannot do that evidential work.